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CRIMINAL LAW
I. SOUTH CAROLINA DEATH PENALTY LAW
A. Introduction
On May 25, 1979, the South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed the death sentences of Joseph Carl Shaw and James
Terry Roach.' State v. Shaw was the first case to be reviewed
under the current South Carolina Death Penalty Act.2 The stat-
ute, enacted subsequent to several recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of
state capital punishment laws, was drafted to conform to the
standards enunciated in those precedents.
In the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia,3 the United
States Supreme Court held that the punishment of death is so
unique in its severity and irrevocability that it cannot be im-
posed under any sentencing procedure creating a risk that the
penalty will be applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The Court, reasoning that the death penalty statutes of Georgia
and Texas failed to adequately guard against that defect, held
those statutes to be violative of the eighth amendment proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment.' The statutes granted
1. 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979). On November 3, 1977, Shaw, Roach, and
Ronald Eugene Mahaffey were arrested; each was indicted for two counts of murder and
conspiracy and single counts of rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery. The prosecution
sought the death penalty for Shaw and Roach but not for Mahaffey, who, through the
process of plea negotiations, agreed to testify against the other two defendants. On De-
cember 12, 1977, Shaw pleaded guilty to all charges. Roach pleaded guilty to two counts
of murder and single counts of rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery. He pleaded nolo
contendere to two counts of conspiracy. Following the requisite presentencing hearing,
the trial judge imposed penalties of death on Shaw and Roach. Id. at 198-99, 255 S.E.2d
at 801. The South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmance of these sentences upheld the
validity of the state death penalty statute. Id. at 199-203, 255 S.E.2d at 802-04.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The court earlier had ana-
lyzed the death penalty statutes in State v. Rodgers, 270 S.C. 285, 242 S.E.2d 215 (1978)
and ruled that the statutes could not be applied retroactively. See Criminal Law, An-
nual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. R.v. 49, 49-55 (1979).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Id. The Court reviewed three cases-two from Georgia and one from Texas. One
Georgia petitioner and the Texas petitioner had been convicted of rape; the second Geor-
1
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the jury nearly unbridled discretion to decide whether a given
defendant would be put to death.5 In response to the Furman
decision, more than two-thirds of the states had, by 1976,
adopted new death penalty statutes.
The South Carolina law in effect at the time of Furman pre-
scribed death as punishment for murder unless the jury recom-
mended the defendant to the mercy of the court. In light of
gia petitioner had been convicted of murder. All three had been sentenced to death
under the applicable state statutes. Id. at 239. Furman was decided per curiam, with the
five concurring justices each writing separate opinions. Justices Marshall and Brennan
took the position that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional; Marshall- addressed
the discriminatory operation of the penalty against certain socio-economic and racial
groups, id. at 363-65 (Marshall, J., concurring), while Brennan contended that capital
punishment is fatally offensive to human dignity. Id. at 282-305 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Justice Douglas was not willing to adopt the per se unconstitutional position, al-
though he recognized the discriminatory aspects of the penalty. Id. at 249-57 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justice White opined that the infrequent and erratic imposition of the
penalty blurred any rational distinction between cases in which it is imposed and ones in
which it is not, thus negating any possible retribution function. Id. at 311-12 (White, J.,
concurring). Finally, in a frequently quoted opinion, Justice Stewart compared the impo-
sition of the death penalty to being struck by lightning, arguing that the uncontrolled
nature of jury discretion permeating the statutes could result in the penalty being arbi-
trarily, wantonly, or freakishly imposed. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. For an excellent survey of the opin-
ions in Furman, see Karge, Capital Punishment: Death for Murder Only, 69 J. CraM. L.
179, 182-87 (1978).
5. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, commented on the statutes as follows:
Georgia law, at the time of the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner
[convicted by rape] . . . ,left the jury a choice between the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or "imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less
than one year nor more than 20 years. Texas law. . . provides that a person
guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in the penitentiary
for life, or for any term of years not less than five."
408 U.S. at 308 n.8. "Georgia law, under which the petitioner [was convicted of murder]
.. . left the jury a choice between the death penalty and life imprisonment." 408 U.S. at
308 n.9 (citations omitted).
6. These statutes followed several distinct patterns. Some retained sentencing dis-
cretion, but supplied standards to guide the exercise of this discretion by providing the
sentencer with a list of aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found before
the penalty could be imposed, by specifying certain aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, along with a procedure for balancing the two, or by allowing the death penalty
only when an aggravating circumstance is found and no mitigating circumstance exists.
Others removed all discretion by mandating death for specific crimes. Note, Discretion
and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HAIRv. L. REv. 1690,
1699-1701 (1974).
7. The state death penalty statute in effect from 1894 to 1974 provided as follows:
Whoever is guilty of murder shall suffer the punishment of death. Pro-
vided, however, that in each case where the prisoner is found guilty of murder,
the jury may find a special verdict recommending him to the mercy of the
2
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Furman, the South Carolina Supreme Court found this law to be
unconstitutional because it gave the judge or jury impermissible
discretion to determine which defendants received the death
penalty." In turn, the General Assembly enacted a statute in
1974 designed to meet the standards of Furman. It required the
death penalty only when the convicted defendant's criminal con-
duct fell within any one of certain designated categories.'
The 1974 statute withstood judicial scrutiny when, in early
1976, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a death sen-
tence.10 In that same year, however, a flurry of activity by the
United States Supreme Court added a new chapter to death
penalty law. The Supreme Court, in five separate opinions, ap-
proved three state death penalty statutes and struck down two.
Court, whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment in the
penitentiary with hard labor during the whole lifetime of the prisoner.
1894 S.C. Acts 785, No. 530 (amending 14 S.C. Stat. 175, No. 91 (1869)).
8. State v. Gibson, 259 S.C. 459, 192 S.E.2d 720 (1972).
9. The 1974 South Carolina law mandated the death penalty for specific crimes as
follows:
Whoever is guilty of murder in the following circumstances shall suffer the
penalty of death:
(1) Murder committed while in the commission of the following crimes or
acts: (a) rape; (b) assault with intent to ravish; (c) kidnapping; (d) burglary; (e)
robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; (f) larceny with use of a deadly
weapon; (g) housebreaking; (h) killing by poison; (i) lying in wait.
(2) Murder committed for hire based on some consideration of value.
(3) Murder of a law enforcement officer or correctional officer while act-
ing in the line of duty.
(4) The person convicted of committing the murder had previously been
convicted of murder, or was convicted of committing more than one murder.
(5) Murder that is willful, deliberate and premediated.
Whoever is guilty of murder under any other circumstance shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment. Provided, however, that notwithstanding the pro-
visions of this section, under no circumstances shall a female who is pregnant
with child be executed so long as she is in that condition.
1974 S.C" Acts 2361, No. 1109 (amending 1894 S.C. Acts 785, No. 530).
10. State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 222 S.E.2d 287 (1976). The South Carolina Supreme
Court observed:
The Legislature of this State, in amending Section 16-52 [the pre-1974
death penalty statute] apparently made a conscious, deliberate effort to com-
ply with the mandate of Furman. We think that effort was successful ....
Section 16-52 allows no such discretion to the trial judge and the jury. The
statute provides certain specific, narrow, well delineated circumstances in
which one who is found guilty of murder must suffer the penalty of death. In
compliance with Furman, neither the trial judge nor jury is given any discre-
tion in the matter.
Id. at 185, 222 S.E.2d at 291.
3
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In Roberts v. Louisiana11 and Woodson v. North Carolina,1 2 the
Court found two state statutes fatally defective because each
lacked objective standards to guide, regularize, and rationalize
the sentencing process and failed to require consideration of the"
circumstances of the offense and the propensities of the of-
fender.13 Both statutes provided mandatory death sentences for
particular crimes. In Gregg v. Georgia,14 Proffitt v. Florida,1 5 and
Jurek v. Texas,16 the Court upheld three death penalty statutes.
According to the Court, these statutes implemented standards
sufficient to guide the discretion of the sentencing authority by
requiring the judge or jury to contemplate the circumstances of
the crime and the character of the defendant before imposing
the penalty of death."7 The Court distinguished these cases from
Furman and explained that "when a life has been taken deliber-
ately by the offender, we cannot say that the [capital] punish-
ment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an ex-
treme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." ' The
Court, however, emphasized that when a defendant's life is at
stake, the judiciary must insure that all necessary safeguards are
followed.""
The Court's reasoning was explained in Gregg: "No longer
can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of
the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction,
decide whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's atten-
tion is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime:
.... -20 Through these decisions the Court sought to alleviate
11. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
13. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-34; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
at 303.
14. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
15. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
16. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
17. The three statutes require specific findings of aggravating circumstances and a
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In addition, all three schemes pro-
vide other safeguards, including automatic review of all death sentences and required
review by the state's highest court. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(4) (West 1974 & Supp.
1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2534.1 to -2537 (1978); TEX. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
18. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
19. Id.
20. 428 U.S. at 197. For an excellent summary of these cases, see Meagher, Capital
Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 261
[Vol. 32
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Justice White's prior frustration at finding "no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not."21
The South Carolina Supreme Court observed the fate of
mandatory death statutes in Woodson and Roberts and stated:
"As our statute does not permit the exercise of controlled discre-
tion in imposing the death penalty required by the recent deci-
sions, but mandates a death penalty upon a finding of murder
.. . it too is constitutionally defective. '22 While invalidating the
South Carolina statute, the court reiterated three principles an-
nounced in Woodson: First, the state's power to punish must be
exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Second, a
death penalty statute cannot allow unguided, unchecked jury
discretion. Finally, a death penalty statute must allow considera-
tion of the individual character and record of each defendant. 3
In 1977, the South Carolina General Assembly revised the
South Carolina Death Penalty Act, using as a model the Georgia
statute that had been affirmed in Gregg. South Carolina's pre-
sent death penalty law resulted from this effort.24 It applies only
to persons who are convicted of or plead guilty to murder 25 and
implements a bifurcated procedure separating the process of ad-
judicating guilt from the sentencing phase. 6 During the latter
proceeding, the sentencing authority, whether judge or jury,
shall consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances specified in the statute;27 before a capital defendant may
(1976).
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408.U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
22. State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 239, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1976).
23. Id. at 238-39, 226 S.E.2d at 895. The court based its decision primarily on
Woodson, because of the similarities between the South Carolina and North Carolina
statutes. See also Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law,
29 S.C.L. REv. 80, 86 (1977).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Cum. Supp. 1979). A detailed explanation of
this statute can be found in the Office of the South Carolina Attorney General, South
Carolina Death Penalty Act-Handbook and Manual of Suggested Forms, Procedures
and Instructions (1977).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
26. Id. § 16-3-20(B).
27. Id. § 16-3-20(C). The portion of the statute referring to those circumstances lists
the considerations to be evaluated as follows:
(a) Aggravating circumstances:
(1) Murder was committed while in the commission of the following
crimes or acts: (a) rape; (b) assault:,with intent to ravish; (c) kidnapping; (d)
1980]
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be sentenced to death, at least one aggravating circumstance
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.2 8 Prior to imposing
the death penalty, the sentencing authority must find the pen-
alty to be supported by the evidence and not imposed as the
result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.29 If a
sentence of death is recommended, the judge or jury must desig-
nate in writing the aggravating circumstance found.3 0 All such
sentences are reviewed automatically by the South Carolina Su-
burglary; (e) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; (f) larceny with use of
a deadly weapon; (g) housebreaking; (h) killing by poison; and (i) physical
torture;
(2) Murder was committed by a person with a prior record or conviction
for murder;
(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another,
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, for-
mer solicitor, or other officer of the'court during or because of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or com-
mitted murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, cor-
rections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
(b) Mitigating, [sic] circumstances:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction
involving the use of violence against another person;
(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act;
(41) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by an-
other person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of an-
other person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substan-
tially impaired;
(7) The age of mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the
murder;
(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
6
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preme Court to determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the in-
fluence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or the judge's
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated
in § 16-3-20, and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant.31
Although the South Carolina statute was patterned after
the Georgia measure, the two statutes vary in several respects.32
First, the Georgia statute enumerates ten aggravating circum-
stances, some of which differ from the South Carolina statute.
One deviation in the Georgia law, particularly interesting in
light of Shaw, is that a murder that is "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim" is viewed as an
aggravating circumstance.33 Under both statutes, however, at
least one aggravating circumstance must be found before a sen-
tence of death can be recommended. Second, the Georgia law
does not specifically list any mitigating circumstances; rather, it
requires the judge to consider, or to instruct the jury to consider,
any mitigating circumstances or other aggravating circum-
stances.3 4 A Georgia jury need not find any mitigating circum-
stances to recommend mercy for the defendant. Provisions for
appellate review, however, are identical in both statutes. 5 This
31. Id. § 16-3-25 (Cum. Supp. 1979). For a summary of the procedural safeguards
in the statute, see State v. Rodgers, 270 S.C. 285, 291-92, 242 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1978) and
Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 29 S.C.L. REv. 80,
90 (1977).
32. Specific provisions in the Georgia statute that differ from the South Carolina
law are the following: GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(2) (1978)(murder committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated bat-
tery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree); id § 27-2534.1(b)(9) (murder com-
mitted by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or
place of lawful confinement); id. § 27-2534.1(b)(10) (murder committed for the purpose
of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another).
33. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b).
34. Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7).
35. Compare id. § 27-2537 with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1980]
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procedure in particular received the full support of the United
States Supreme Court because it "serves as a check against the
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 3 6
While the Georgia statute specifically has received the
United States Supreme Court's approval, differences between
that statute and the South Carolina law would not appear to
make the latter constitutionally infirm. The South Carolina stat-
ute's major difference, the enumeration of specific mitigating
considerations, is faithful to the Supreme Court's guidance pro-
vided in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. Justifiably, it may be in-
ferred that the Court believes more specific guidelines are not
required at this time.
B. The Decision-State v. Shaw
Shaw presented the first occasion for the South Carolina
Supreme Court to utilize the appellate review provisions of the
revised death penalty statute. Although the court's decision did
not expressly refer to the statutory standards, apparently, its
analysis was designed to satisfy them. The court focused on
three main issues: first, whether the statute insures the particu-
larization and individualization required by the United States
Supreme Court; second, whether the statute provides for appro-
priate discretion in the sentencing process; and third, whether
the sentence was fair in light of the specific circumstances of this
case.
1. Particularization a n d Individualization.-The South
Carolina Supreme Court remarked in Shaw that "[t]he new
death penalty procedures focus the sentencing authority's atten-
tion on the particularized nature of the crime and the particu-
larized characteristics of the individual defendant. 3 7 Before a
death penalty is affirmed under the statute, the sentencing au-
thority must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 206.
37. 273 S.C. at 203, 255 S.E.2d at 804. The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized that a fair and just system requires contemplation of the circumstances of the
crime and the propensities of the offender. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51,
55 (1937). Additionally, the drafters of the Model Penal Code have concluded that "evi-
dence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence,
including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances . . . ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1974).
[Vol. 32
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least one aggravating circumstance, balance it against any miti-
gating circumstances, and determine that the aggravating cir-
cumstance outweighs any extenuation. By this method, the
unique and relevant qualities of the offense and the offender
converge to focus the sentencing proceeding.
In Shaw, the guilt adjudication stage consisted solely of
quilty pleas by Shaw and Roach; therefore, the "particulariza-
tion" occurred in the sentencing half of the bifurcated capital
proceeding. Pertinent data concerning the character of the de-
fendants, the sentencing procedure, and the victims were trans-
mitted to the supreme court through two reports from the trial
judge.38 According to these documents, three statutory aggra-
vating circumstances 9 were found beyond a reasonable doubt
against both defendants: assault with intent to ravish, kidnap-
ping, and robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Four stat-
utory mitigating circumstances 40 were in evidence for Shaw: his
age and mentality, his lack of prior criminal history, his extreme
mental and emotional disturbance at the time of the commission
of the crime, and his substantially impaired capacity to appreci-
ate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
requirements of law. These four considerations, as well as the
facts that Roach acted under duress or domination of another
person and that he was below the age of eighteen at the time of
the crimes,"' were introduced in mitigation of the case against
Roach.
On review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
death penalty and the trial judge's findings of statutory aggra-
vating circumstances were supported by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the death sentence had not been im-
posed as a result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.42 In the decision, the court made no reference to the age
of the defendants (Roach was seventeen at the time of the
crime; Shaw was twenty-two), or to results of psychiatric evalua-
tions performed on the defendants (Roach was found to have a
38. The reports on Shaw and Roach are reproduced in Appendices B, 273 S.C. at
219, 255 S.E.2d at 811, and C, id. at 231, 255 S.E.2d at 819, of the opinion.
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(b), (c) & (e) (Cune. Supp. 1979).
40. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1), (2), (6) & (7).
41. Id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(5) & (9).
42. 273 S.C. at 210, 255 S.E.2d at 807.
1980]
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degree of mental retardation and antisocial personality disor-
ders,43 while Shaw was deemed a latent schizophrenic with pos-
sible toxic psychosis from alcohol and drug abuse)."
The court ruled that the assignment of numerical values to
the statutory mitigating and aggravating circumstances was not
necessary to balance such factors properly.45 Indeed, the absence
of fully objective criteria did not render the Georgia statute un-
constitutional in Gregg:
While such standards are by necessity somewhat general,
they do provide guidance to t h e sentencing authority and
thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence
that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary. Where the sen-
tencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied
upon in reaching its decision, the further safeguard of mean-
ingful appellate review is available to ensure that death
sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish
manner.46
The South Carolina Supreme Court considered the provisions of
the South Carolina statute "indistinguishable" from those ap-
proved in Gregg.41 The court thus affirmed the findings of the
trial court and, in doing so, declined to embark upon a possibly
futile attempt to precisely quantify, compare, and balance the
relevant circumstances of this case.'8
2. Discretion in the Sentencing Process.-In their appeals,
Shaw and Roach raised the discretion issue by arguing that the
South Carolina statute unconstitutionally grants the solicitor
unbridled discretion to extend mercy to any capital offenders. 9
The Gregg decision had rejected this argument, and in the
court's view, the matter warranted no further discussion.50 In
43. Id. at 232, 255 S.E.2d at 820.
44. Id. at 220, 255 S.E.2d at 811.
45. Id. at 205, 255 S.E.2d at 804.
46. 428 U.S. at 193-95 (footnote omitted).
47. 273 S.C. at 203, 255 S.E.2d at 803-04.
48. Id. at 212, 255 S.E.2d at 807.
49. Id. at 204, 255 S.E.2d at 804.
50. The Supreme Court, in Gregg, observed:
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the is-
sues before us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice system
makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a can-
didate for the death penalty... Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the
decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.
[Vol. 32
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addition, Shaw and Roach characterized as capricious and arbi-
trary the decision of the solicitor to seek the death penalty
against them but not against their co-defendant Mahaffey.51 The
court disagreed, citing two distinguishing factors between Ma-
haffey and the two appellant-defendants. First, the court noted
evidence indicating that both Shaw and Roach were triggermen,
while no evidence linked Mahaffey with any use of the rifle. Sec-
ond, Mahaffey had agreed to testify against Shaw and Roach.
Since no other witness to the crime was alive, Mahaffey's testi-
mony was an integral part of the state's case. The court re-
marked further that "[t]he Solicitor chose to bargain with Ma-
haffey because it was unlikely that the death penalty could have
been imposed on him. '5 2 Undoubtedly, the court was cognizant
of the value of plea negotiating as a prosecutorial tool and was
influenced by the pragmatic appeal of the state's arguments. Ac-
cordingly, the court quickly dismissed the defendant's objections
relying on Gregg as sufficient authority.53
The South Carolina Supreme Court's analysis of the factors
distinguishing Shaw and Roach from Mahaffey suggests substan-
tial statutory construction on its part. Although the statute calls
for the sentencing authority to consider aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances, it does not authorize the supreme court to do
so. The court is limited to a review of the influence of prejudice
or arbitrariness, the imposition by the sentencer of excessive or
disproportionate punishment, and the weight of evidence sup-
porting the sentencer's finding of statutorily recognized aggra-
vating circumstances. 55
3. The Standard of Review-Proportionality.-Finally,
the court reviewed the death sentence to determine if it was ex-
cessive or disportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant. In the past, the
court has used a two-pronged approach to test proportionality:
428 U.S. at 199.
51. 273 S.C. at 204, 255 S.E.2d at 804.
52. Id. In this discussion the court made a reference to a more recent case that lends
some support to defendant's contention that the prosecutor's actions were arbitrary and
capricious. The opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), however, did not discuss
that issue in the context of a prosecutor's discretion to prosecute.
53. 273 S.C. at 204, 255 S.E.2d at 804.
54. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-8-20(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with id. § 16-3-25(B).
55. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
1980]
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"First, the historical principle that the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause is designed to prevent inhuman and barbarous
treatment. Second, that the sentence must not be grossly out of
proportion with the severity of the crime.""8 The first test the
court has acknowledged is a subjective one, requiring a determi-
nation of whether a death sentence in the specific case is "inhu-
man and barbarous treatment" in the context of law and soci-
ety-an undertaking rife with normative and moral implications.
The second test is more objective and requires the court to con-
sider such factors as the characteristics of the defendant, the
gravity of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the statute,
and the severity of the defendant's punishment relative to the
punishments meted out for other offenses. 57
In Shaw the court recognized that the proportionality test
necessitates a comparative analysis of the crime, the defendant,
and the punishment in any capital case. Apparently, however,
the court felt that this approach was not possible. "Any system
of review that requires a comparison of each case with all similar
prior cases must have a beginning. There will be a first case for
each type or category of capital case that may appear and that
first case necessarily cannot be compared to any other similar
cases. 1)8 Thus, the lack of any comparable cases renders impos-
sible any proportionality analysis.
59
C. Conclusion
In this opinion, the supreme court did not engage in an ex-
tensive discussion of the mechanics of the state death penalty
statute specifically, or of the arguments for and against the
death penalty generally. Indeed, such a discussion may have
been thought unnecessary, since the South Carolina statute is
56. Stockton v. Leeke, 269 S.C. 459, 462, 237 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1977). In Gregg, the
United States Supreme Court averred that the requirement of proportionality insures
that decisions will be uniform and that criminal law will parallel contemporary social
thought. Thus, two tests must be met before a given death penalty law survives eighth
amendment analysis: Contemporary opinion must support the use of the death penalty
for the given crime and the court must conclude that the punishment is not dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime. 428 U.S. at 127. See also Murchison, Towards A
Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORY L.J. 469, 549-50 (1978).
57. 269 S.C. 459, 463, 237 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1977).
58. 273 S.C. at 211, 255 S.E.2d at 807.
59. Id.
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apparently a "safe" one, fashioned after the Georgia law ex-
pressly deemed constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court.e° In South Carolina, the last public executions took place
almost two decades ago."' This state now has a death penalty
statute that appears to meet constitutional standards, its valid-
ity proclaimed by Shaw.
II. THE ROLE OF THE, JURY IN CAPITAL CASES
Two cases after Shaw provided guidance for the role of the
jury in this bifurcated process. While the cases dealt with sev-
eral very different issues, each facilitated more specific definition
of juror's responsibilities in trials for capital offenses.
In State v. Tyner6 2 and State v. Gilbert,e" the supreme
court affirmed the convictions but set aside the death penalties
that had been imposed at trial.6 4 In both cases, improper closing
arguments by the solicitor during the sentencing phase provided
the grounds for vacating the sentences. The solicitor had in-
formed the jury in each case that any decision they reached
would automatically be reviewed by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court. Further, he suggested that the case ultimately
might be heard by the United States Supreme Court. 5 The
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Furthermore, such a discussion may have
been unproductive. In Gregg, the United States Supreme Court noted that statistical
studies on deterrence are inconclusive. Id. at 183-85. Plus, statistics themselves some-
times can be meaningless. Id. In a much publicized study, Isaac Ehrlich theorized that
one additional execution per year between 1933 and 1969 may have resulted in, on the
average, seven or eight fewer murders. Jon Peck countered with a contention that a one
percent change in per capita income would produce a greater effect on the homicide rate
than a one percent increase in the number of executions. Borowitz, Under Sentence of
Death, 64 A.B.A.J. 1259, 1259 (1978). The mass of information and "facts" is likely to be
incomprehensible to most citizens.
61. See McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The End of an Era, 24
S.C.L. RE V. 762, 771 (1972).
62. - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979).
63. - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979).
64. Defendants in Gilbert, J.D. Gleaton and Larry Gilbert, appeared in a rehearing
on the sentence portion of their convictions. Their death penalty sentences were reim-
posed on February 26, 1980, in the Lexington Court of Common Pleas.
65. In Tyner, the solicitor made the following remarks:
"If you make a recommendation of the death penalty, it does not stop there
because you are making that recommendation to the Judge; he must review the
facts of the case. He must review your recommendation and then he must de-
cide if you are right or not in your recommendation. No other crime in South
Carolina has that. Then, he makes his determination.. . . It doesn't stop with
13
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court reasoned that these references to the appellate review pro-
cedure by the prosecutor may have caused the jury to relax their
caution in making findings of fact from the evidence and thereby
surrender, in whole or in part, their sentencing responsibility to
a higher court. 6 Consequently, the solicitors' actions in both
cases constituted reversible error and mandated overturning the
death sentences.
South Carolina has long recognized the "quasi-judicial na-
ture of the duties imposed on the solicitor. 6 7 Yet no clear de-
lineation "between legitimate argument[s] and unauthorized
statement[s]" by a solicitor can be drawn.6 8 Prosecutorial argu-
ments should focus on a rational summation and analysis of the
evidence and its bearing on the defendant's guilt.6 9 If a party
alleges that improper or unfair arguments were made at trial,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has traditionally required a
showing of four elements: (1) timely objection to the argument,
(2) the substance of the objectionable language, (3) the failure of
the court to sufficiently warn the jury not to consider the im-
him. There's an automatic review by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the
five highest justices in this State. They will determine everything that has hap-
pened here since last Monday; they will look at the evidence; they will look at
your recommendation; ... But it doesn't stop with them. It can be appealed
on to the United States Supreme Court in Washington, nine of the highest
justices in the land. They look at everything the South Carolina Supreme
Court did, everything Judge Moore did, everything that you did, everything
that we did, and determine whether the facts in the case warrant the death
penalty."
- S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 565-66 (quoting Record at 1198-1200)(citation omitted).
The solicitor's closing arguments in Gilbert were substantially the same as in Tyner. -
S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 894.
66. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 335-36, 240 S.E.2d 833 839-40 (1977); State v. Ty-
ner, - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 566; State v. Gilbert, - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 894.
See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1448, 1452 (1965).
67. State v. Behune, 104 S.C. 353, 357, 89 S.E. 153, 154 (1916). This view would
seem to be consistent with the Code of Professional Responsibility. "[T]he responsibility
of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,
not merely to convict." A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, Ethical Consider-
ation 7-13 (1970).
68. State v. Robertson, 26 S.C. 117, 118, 1 S.E. 443, 444 (1887).
69. See Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw.
L.J. 505, 506-07 (1975). "The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would di-
vert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence by interjecting issues
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law or by mak-
ing predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.8(d) (1971).
14
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proper argument, and (4) prejudice to the defendant's right to
obtain a fair and impartial trial.70 A review of case law reveals
that the South Carolina Supreme Court has been reluctant to
overturn decisions on the basis of improper arguments made by
the solicitor.71 These cases, however, can be distinguished from
Tyner and Gilbert. The alleged improper comments in the ear-
lier cases pertained to characteristics of the defendant or the
victim and were designed to arouse the passion or sentiment of
the jury. In Tyner and Gilbert, on the other hand, the disputed
statements referred, at least indirectly, to the jury's duties and
responsibilities. Logically, courts would be more inclined to dis-
favor jury arguments with such overtones; indeed the Supreme
Court of Georgia has reversed sentences for this reason.7
In Tyner, the court also observed that the trial judge failed
to instruct the jury that it could recommend life imprisonment
even if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more
aggravating circumstances was present. This error, according to
the court, also would have required vacating the death sen-
tence.7 3 The Supreme Court of Georgia has reached a similar
result.
74
70. State v. Meehan, 160 S.C. 111, 129, 158 S.E. 151, 158 (1931). The doctrine of in
favorem vitae, applied in capital cases, partially alters this test, since it permits the court
to search for any prejudicial error in the record on its own initiative, without objection to
or assignment of error by the appellant. State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 187, 222 S.E.2d 287,
292 (1976).
71. In each of the following cases convictions were upheld: State v. McGill, 191 S.C.
1, 8, 3 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1939)(solicitor accused the defendant of acting like one of the
"cannibals of Borneo" and wondered aloud why bystanders had not shot defendant down
"like a dog" as he beat the victim); State v. McDonald, 184 S.C. 290, 299, 192 S.E. 365,
370 (1937)(solicitor stated that if defendant were not convicted of murder, he would be
sent to the State Hospital, where he would probably later be found sane and released).
Cf. State v. Craig, 267 S.C. 262, 265-67, 227 S.E.2d 306-08 (1976)(statement made by
prosecutor at the conclusion of the voir dire examination of a prospective juror that "I'm
not up here to give this defendant a Baby Ruth, I'm up here to put him in the electric
chair" was held to be not inflammatory or prejudicial).
72. E.g., Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Prevatte v. State, 233
Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365 (1975). In Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37 (1977),
the Georgia Supreme Court noted: "[T]his type of remark has an unusual potential for
corrupting the death sentencing process.. . . Comments about appellate safeguards on
the death penalty suggest to the jury that they can pass the responsibility for the death
sentence on to this court." Id. at 146, 240 S.E.2d at 40 (citation omitted).
73. The court decided that omission of the necessary charge to the jury was an "ar-
bitrary factor" under S.C. Con ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978). - S.C. at
258 S.E.2d at 566.
74. The Georgia Supreme Court has observed that the jury must consider two sepa-
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In Gilbert, defendants Gilbert and Gleaton expressed a de-
sire to testify on their own behalf. By choosing this alternative,
Gilbert and Gleaton waived their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; defense counsel, however, had assured them that if they
took the stand they could refuse to answer any questions that
might incriminate them and the trial judge confirmed this ad-
vice. 5 When the defendants subsequently took the stand, they
answered no questions relating to the crime and responded only
to inquiries about events occurring after they were taken into
custody. During their testimony, the defendants invoked the
fifth amendment privilege and each time the trial judge upheld
their right to do so. 7 1 The majority found no reversible error in
this procedure. Noting the risk that is always inherent when tes-
tifying on one's own behalf,77 the court pointed out that defen-
dants were aware of their option to testify or not, and they vol-
untarily elected to take the stand. Although they were
erroneously advised of their rights and even though the trial
judge erred, the majority maintained that the trial judge took all
available steps to safeguard the defendants' fifth amendment
rights. "We are unpersuaded the invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege by appellants, albeit improper, worked any
greater prejudice to them than would have resulted had they ex-
ercised their right not to testify or had they been required to
answer all proper questions.
78
Justice Rhodes, in a dissent joined by Justice Lewis, took a
different point of view. He stated that the repeated invocation of
the privilege against self-incrimination by Gilbert and Gleaton
while testifying in their own defense probably had a greater
prejudicial impact on the jurors than if the defendants had
opted not to testify at all. Justice Rhodes acknowledged that the
trial judge was acting to protect the constitutional rights of the
rate issues during the sentencing phase of the death penalty proceeding. First, it must
decide if the state has proved the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance.
Second, it must consider the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances to deter-
mine whether the death penalty is appropriate in the case. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327,
335, 240 S.E.2d 833, 839 (1977).
75. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 893-94.
76. For the defendants, the response became so reflexive that they even invoked the
privilege in response to questions from their own attorney. Id. at _. 258 S.E.2d at 895.
77. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 894.
78. Id. at , 258 S.E.2d at 894.
[Vol. 32
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defendants, but argued that appellate review should focus on the
existence of actual prejudice and not on the intentions of
the trial judge. In a capital case, he contended, the effects of
prejudice on the defendants cannot be minimized. Justice
Rhodes explained:
Here, . . . the jury is confronted with the affirmative acts of
the defendants in taking the witness stand but refusing to an-
swer any questions that were directed to them concerning their
guilt or innocence, even though their right to life depended on
the outcome of the trial .... It is illogical to conclude other
than that the jury was substantially influenced against the ap-
pellants by reason of the procedure here followed. 9
Consequently, Justice Rhodes opined that the case should be re-
versed in its entirety and remanded. for a new trial.
The fifth amendment issue was not raised on appeal by de-
fendants in Gilbert but was addressed by the court under the
principle of in favorem vitae.80 According to this rule, which is
intended to avert miscarriages of justice in capital cases, the su-
preme court is required to search carefully for any prejudicial
error that may have occurred in the prior capital trial, whether
or not the error was made the subject of an appropriate ob-
jection, motion, or appeal by the defendant."' The majority ex-
amined the fifth amendment issue and concluded that Gilbert
and Gleaton were not prejudiced. The dissent, conversely, in-
sisted that the procedure at trial constituted reversible error.
While both groups appeared to agree that the doctrine of in
favorem vitae is a viable and key component of death sentence
review proceedings in South Carolina, the divergence of opinion
resulted from disparate beliefs about the nature of appellate re-
view of capital cases. The dissent advocated a "liberal policy of
appellate review" and contended that the court has historically
adhered to such an approach.82 The majority, though, would
79. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 895 (Rhodes, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 893.
81. The supreme court stated in State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 222 S.E.2d 287 (1976):
"As is our custom in cases of this nature, we have, in favorem vitae, carefully examined
the record for any errors affecting the substantial rights of the accused, even though not
made a ground of appeal." Id. at 187, 222 S.E.2d at 292. See generally McDonald, Capi-
tal Punishment in South Carolina: The End of an Era, 24 S.C.L. REv. 762, 774-75
(1972).
82. Justice Rhodes, quoting from State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 274-75, 122 S.E.2d
1980]
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seem to require some greater showing of prejudice and error for
reversal of death sentences.
Defendant in Tyner also argued that the trial judge had
erred in excusing a prospective juror from duty because of the
juror's opposition to the death penalty. The following exchange
involving the defense attorney, the judge, and the juror occurred
at the voir dire examination:
"Q. [A]re you for or against the death penalty in South
Carolina?
"A. Do I have to answer that?
"THE COURT: Yes, Sir. Just answer yes or no, are you for it
or against it?
"A. I'm against it."
"THE COURT: Are there any circumstances under the law
for which you would vote for the death
penalty?
"A. I would say yes.
''ss
The following examination subsequently took place between the
solicitor and the juror:
"Q. If evidence was presented to you in this case of aggrava-
tion and aggravating circumstances, would you vote to
give the defendant the death penalty?
"A. Say that to me again.
"Q. After all the evidence in the case where the state presents
its testimony from witnesses on that stand and where the
defense presents testimony from witnesses from that
stand and that evidence justified the death penalty,
based on that evidence could you vote to give the defen-
dant the death penalty?
"A. No.')18
The court, citing the United States Supreme Court opinion in
622, 630 (1961), observed:
The power of the law to take the life of human beings for a violation
thereof is one which should be and is exercised with extreme caution. ...
When it is made to appear that anything has occurred which may have im-
properly influenced the action of the jury, the accused should be granted a new
trial, although he may appear to be ever so guilty, because it may be said that
his guilt has not been ascertained in the manner prescribed by law.
S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 896 (Rhodes, J., dissenting).
83. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 562 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 562 (citations omitted).
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Witherspoon v. Illinois,5 held that this juror's unwillingness to
impose the death penalty in any circumstances was a proper ba-
sis on which the juror could be excused. 8 In Witherspoon, the
United States Supreme Court prescribed limits for excusing ve-
niremen ruling that no juror could be dismissed because of gen-
eral opposition to the penalty or scruples against its imposi-
tion. The Court implied that the trial judge must make an
"effort to find out whether their [the veniremen's] scruples
would invariably compel them to vote against capital punish-
ment."8 8 This test is substantially the same as the one employed
by South Carolina courts before Witherspoon or Tyner.89
The issue in Tyner was whether the court went far enough
to establish the juror's irrevocable commitment to vote against
the death penalty without regard to the facts of the case.90 Here,
the trial judge directly asked the juror if there were circum-
stances under which he could vote for the death penalty, and he
responded affirmatively. Later, however, the juror answered in
the negative to the more lengthy and confusing query from the
solicitor. This vacillation may have indicated a degree of indeci-
sion or consternation on the part of the juror, but it hardly
seems sufficient to place him in the category of "invariably" op-
posed. The court could have required greater probing from the
trial judge.
Surprisingly, the court failed to point out that the pertinent
85. 391 U.s. 510 (1968).
86. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 562.
87. 391 U.S. at 520-23. The Court did not say that the exclusion of jurors opposed to
capital punishment necessarily results in an unrepresentative jury or an increased num-
ber of convictions, but it did hold that the Illinois procedure "crossed the line of neutral-
ity" by making possible a "hanging jury." Id. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that
asking jurors if they are automatically opposed to the death penalty without regard to
the evidence was a "semantic illusion." Id. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 515.
89. State v. Neely, 271 S.C. 33, 37, 244 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1978)(citing State v. Atkin-
son, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970) and Thomas v. Leeke, 257 S.C. 491, 186 S.E.2d
516 (1970)). In Thomas, the supreme court found that the jurors possessed "much more
than a general opposition to the death penalty from which the judge could conclude only
that their feeling about the death penalty had been predetermined." 257 S.C. at 502, 186
S.E.2d at 521. The trial judge questioned the prospective jurors extensively (asking one
juror five separate times whether he was opposed to the death penalty) until the jurors
unequivocally acknowledged that their objections could not be changed by the evidence.
Id.
90. 391 U.S. at 515.
1980]
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state statute specifies that a juror should not be excused unless
he is "unable to return a verdict of guilty according to the
law."'" This statutory standard appears to be substantially simi-
lar to the court's analysis under Witherspoon; it is interesting
that the court did not find it relevant authority for its holding in
Tyner.
Tyner and Gilbert defined certain boundaries for closing ar-
guments by the prosecution, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and grounds for excusing jurors in capital cases. The cases
thus refined trial procedural rules and established more pre-
cisely jury participation in that process. As the death penalty
statute makes clear, that role is a crucial one.
III. MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE
In State v. Bendoly,9 2 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
ruled that defendants, who were charged with conspiracy and as-
sualt and battery, should have been permitted to testify regard-
ing their good faith belief in the legality of their actions. 3 At
trial, they were not permitted to testify that they thought they
were acting with lawful authority.9 4 The basis for this belief was
their suspicion that the victim, Riess, a former employee and
tenant, had broken into defendant Bendoly's home in Cleveland,
Ohio, and stolen valuable items. Bendoly reported the theft to
the local police and informed them that he suspected RiessY5
When Reiss was in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, Bendoly and
two of his employees came to South Carolina, allegedly to take
Riess to the police for questioning." Their seizure of Riess was
witnessed and reported to the police who quickly located defen-
dants. Riess was found in the trunk of Bendoly's car.
e
9
Bendoly testified at trial that he had assumed that the com-
plaint, which he signed in Ohio, automatically created an arrest
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(E) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
92. 273 S.C. 47, 254 S.E.2d 287 (1979).
93. Brief of Respondent at vii. Defendants were charged with kidnapping, coispir-
acy to kidnap, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. They appealed
their convictions on the latter two counts.
94. Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 5.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Brief of Respondent at v.
100 [Vol. 32
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warrant giving him authority to make a citizen's arrest.9 8 The
defense asserted that defendants' intent to effect a valid citizen's
arrest and their good faith belief in the legality of their actions
constituted a proper defense to the crime as defined in the
statute.9
The opinion of the supreme court in State v. Bendoly
stated only the conclusion: "we are of the view appellants should
have been permitted to present their side of the story."100 Their
story was that, in good faith, they believed they were acting with
lawful authority. 01 The supreme court implicitly adopted appel-
lants' theory by permitting defendants to present this story
since otherwise the proferred evidence would have been properly
excluded as irrelevant to any material issue in the case.
This defense, a good faith belief in the legality of an act, is
known as mistake of law. 102 "A defendant's error as to his au-
thority to engage in a particular activity, if based upon a mis-
taken view of legal requirements (or ignorance thereof), is a mis-
take of law."'' 03 Ignorance of law and mistake of law have been
interchanged incorrectly by courts and commentators. The dis-
tinction between the two was made in an early South Carolina
case: "The terms, in legal contemplation, do not impart the
same significance and should not be confounded. Ignorance
iniplies a total want of knowledge in reference to the subject
matter. Mistake admits a knowledge, but implies a wrong
conclusion.'
0 4
It is useful to make this distinction because a defense of ig-
norance of law traditionally is not permitted.105 The mistake of
98. Record at 207-10.
99. Brief of Appellants-Resppondents at 38-39.
100. State v. Bendoly, 273 S.C. 47, 49-50, 254 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1979).
101. Record, vol. 2, at 205-11.
102. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
103. Id.
104. Hutton v. Edgerton & Richards, 6 S.C. 485, 489 (1875).
105. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1909). The maxim, ignoran-
tia legis neminem excusat, ignorance of the law excuses no man, has been an accepted
legal doctrine for centuries. Support for the maxim is generally based on two grounds.
First, to allow this excuse as a defense would encourage ignorance; thus, "public policy
sacrifices the individual to the general good." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881).
Second, to honor the excuse would compel courts "to enter upon questions of fact,
isoluble and interminable." 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 172 (1861). The
early case of Lawrence v. Beaubien, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 623 (1831), reflects South Caro-
lina's reason for adherence to the rule: "[t]o allow one to shelter himself from the pun-
1980]
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law defense, however, is permitted under circumstances in which
the preclusion of the defense would be manifestly unjust. Those
circumstances include: reliance upon a statute which might later
be held unconstitutional; 06 reliance upon a judicial decision
prior to a different holding by a superior court; 07 and reliance
upon the apparent authority of a government official if the re-
liance was "objectively reasonable under the circumstances."'' 05
The defense is also recognized when an offense requires special
elements of proof for guilt to be found 09 or it is determined
from the statute that a specific intent is essential to constitute a
crime. °
ishment due to crime, under a pretended, or even real ignorance of the law, would
uproot the very foundation of society: and in this we see the reason and propriety of the
maxim, and the fitness of its application." Id. at 648. Ignorance of law is allowed, occa-
sionally, as a defense to violations of regulatory statutes. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957). It has been held, however, that a person is charged with the responsibility to
learn whether a statute applies to him. United States v. International Minerals & Chemi-
cal Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). See generally United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 227-
37 (D.C. Cir.)(Bazelon, C.J. concurring), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); Hall & Selig-
man, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1941); Keedy, Ignorance and
Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75 (1908); O'Connor, Mistake and Igno-
rance in Criminal Cases, 39 MoD. L. REv. 644 (1976); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in
Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35 (1939) for extensive treatment of the origins and
justifications of the maxim. But see Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 671 (1976) for the proposition that the rule no longer is justified.
106. Claybrook v. State, 164 Tenn. 440, 51 S.W.2d 499 (1932).
107. State eX rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934).
108. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947-48 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(emphasis
original).
109. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 931-35 (2d ed. 1969). There may be a requirement
that the act be done maliciously, corruptly, willfully, or knowingly. Id.
110. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977). The rationale for the defense in this situation is that a crime is com-
mitted "only if the defendant performs the actus reus with an intention to violate the
law or without ground for believing his action is unlawful. A good faith mistake as to the
legality of his activity, or failure to act, is a valid defense to prosecution for such a
crime." Id. at 919. Indeed, the briefs in Bendoly focused on the language of the kidnap-
ping statute, and argued over the elements essential to prove guilt, in particular, if the
terms "unlawfully" and "without lawful authority" meant that specific unlawful intent
was an essential element. It it was, then testimony relevent to negate unlawful or crimi-
nal intent should be permitted. Brief of Appellants-Respondents at 46-53. See notes 18
& 19 supra. South Carolina is the only state with a statute that demands the punish-
ment of life imprisonment but does not specifically require that the prosecution prove
intent. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute states:
Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or
carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority of
law, except when a minor is seized or taken by a parent thereof, shall be guilty
of a felony and, upon conviction, shall suffer the punishment of life imprison-
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Ultimately, the conclusion is correct. Unfortunately, the
court failed to articulate the basis for and limitations of its deci-
sion.111 The reasons for the decision are not "concisely and
briefly stated in writing and preserved in the record of the case"
as required by law. 1 2 In its policy-making discretion, the court
ment unless sentenced for murder as provided in § 16-3-20.
Id. Prior to 1976, the South Carolina statute included language that indicated an ele-
ment of criminal intent. See 1937 S.C. Acts No. 106. In 1976, the statute took its present
form, absent any express requirement of criminal intent. Yet the maximum penalty re-
mains. Although the South Carolina kidnapping statute required some form of specific
intent prior to the 1976 amendment, no South Carolina cases have focused on that ele-
ment. The only two kidnapping cases that have been reported focused on the element of
ransom, which was present in the statute at that time. See State v. Allen, 266 S.C. 468,
224 S.E.2d 881 (1976); State v. Woods, 189 S.C. 281, 1 S.E.2d 190 (1939). In addition, no
records exist to report if the legislative intent was to make a finding of criminal intent
necessary for conviction under the statute.
The issue of specific intent as an element of the crime of kidnapping has been ad-
dressed by courts of other jurisdictions. See United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964);
United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d
1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975); State v. Holland, 120 La. 429, 45 So. 380 (1907); People
v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).
Two grounds support the conclusion that the intent of the General Assembly of
South Carolina was to require specific intent under the present kidnapping statute: the
history of the statute and the punishment it provides. For thirty-two years the statute
required the intent to demand ransom; for eight years, it required "criminal intent" and
"without lawful authority." The 1976 amendments struck the ransom requirement and
added only "without authority of law," but retained the punishment of life imprison-
ment without exception. No state in the union has a statute which punishes kidnapping
with life imprisonment unless it is an aggravated kidnapping, one that is done with crim-
inal intent. Failure to change the punishment implies a legislative intent to continue to
require a specific intent.
With this background and the requirement that a criminal statute "must be strictly
construed against the state," it seems perfectly proper for the supreme court to have
construed the "without lawful authority" language of the kidnapping statute to continue
to require a showing of criminal intent. Such a construction of the kidnapping statute
would allow the mistake of law defense, and thus, would have provided a reasoned basis
for the court's holding that defendants were entitled to testify concerning their good
faith-belief in the legality of their actions.
111. See note 110 supra.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-9-280 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
When a judgment or decree is reversed or affirmed by the Supreme Court
every point made and distinctly stated in the cause and fairly arising upon the
record thereof shall be concisely and briefly stated in writing and preserved in
the record of the case, except the Court may file memorandum opinions in
unanimous decisions when the Court determines that a full written opinion
would have no precedential value and any one or more of the following circum-
stances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the court for decision:
(1) that a judgment of the trial court is based on findings of fact which are not
clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3)
23
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set a precedent by permitting the mistake of law defense in this
case but did not perform its proper function of guidance by de-
fining the parameters of the holding. The result is a lack of no-
tice to the trial courts which may cause future errors and lost
prosecutions and a "rough justice" approach to a complex area
of criminal law.
Ernest R. Reeves, Jr. and Patricia M. Sabalis*
that the order of an administrative agency is supported by such quantum of
evidence as prescribed by the statute or law under which judicial review is
permitted; (4) that no error of law appears.
* Ernest R. Reeves, Jr. wrote the two sections on capital punishment; Patricia M.
Sabalis authored the third section on mistake of law.
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